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PENALTIES: PUNISHMENTS, PRICES, OR REWARDS?
I. INTRODUCTION
 Even a dog knows the difference between being kicked and tripped over, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously declared.1 We higher-order 
animals seem programmed to react differently to intentional attacks than to accidents 
that cause us pain. Instinctively, we penalize or forgive others based on attitudes or 
motives that we read into their acts. Animal behaviorists have recently confirmed 
what pet parents long observed—dogs also have an innate sense of justice and become 
angry or despondent when treated unfairly or cheated out of promised rewards. 
Perhaps further research will reveal they accept their keeper’s penalties with 
contrition only when they think they’re deserved.
 For millennia, penalties for transgressions have ranged from pure prices to pure 
punishments based on the intentions, actions, and harms caused. The world of sport 
similarly enforces commands or rules by imposing a range of sanctions. In law, 
ideally, not only does the punishment fit the crime, but in reality, the punishment 
makes the crime. So, too, prospectively in sport, the penalty makes the sporting foul. 
 Some penalties do not fall neatly into the category of price or punishment. The 
simple dichotomy between priced options and pure punishments turns out to be a 
continuum: At one end, a penalty has no discouragement or disapproval attaching 
and operates purely as a price—a known cost of deliberately exercising an option. At 
a neighboring point, a penalty can act as a deduction for an imperfection that 
automatically reduces a score, diminishes a reward, or adds a burden. Judged sports 
such as gymnastics or figure skating regularly penalize imperfections. No culpability 
or moral disapproval accompanies the penalty—it attaches not because the actor did 
something bad, but because the actor performed badly.
 Somewhere further along this continuum, penalties operate to compensate 
injured opponents. Everyday torts or basketball fouls can result in some form of 
compensation or foul shots. In theory, that compensation counterbalances the unjust 
harm suffered, or strips the violator of an unjustified benefit, keeping a contest or 
relationship in balance. Where the benefit to the transgressor outweighs the harm to 
the victim, the victim can be made whole while the violator still gains on balance. In 
that case, the violation that incurs the penalty may still amount to exercising an 
option and the penalty acts as a price, often worth paying.
 At some point further still from penalty as pure price or option, penalties can act 
as more than compensation for the injured. These penalties are designed to punish 
and thereby deter those who intentionally, recklessly, or negligently cause or threaten 
harm. Some penalties also denounce the transgression—the word “foul” connotes 
disapproval—and can include heavy fines, suspension, or both.
 Finally, at a far end of the continuum, penalties act as retributive punishments: 
conscious inflictions of deserved pain and suffering beyond what’s necessary to deter 
and denounce, specifically designed to discomfort and disadvantage the party 
condemned—often including sanctions outside the immediate transaction or 
contest—with a culpable mental state required.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1909).
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 While law and sport have for millennia utilized penalties, philosophy of law—
and more recently, philosophy of sport—have only begun to categorize and analyze 
penalties along the continuum between prices and punishments. In the world of 
sport, because of a relative lack of self-consciousness, rulebooks of many major 
professional sports contain f laws and inconsistencies which, if eliminated, could 
improve the game, reduce cheating and injury, and promote a greater respect for the 
sport itself. But that practical program awaits the aid of others, and may not serve 
financial interests of team owners or athletes. For now let’s survey the nature, history, 
and purpose of penalties along the continuum between price and punishment in 
order to illuminate and enrich sport.
II. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI
 As early as 1750 B.C. in Babylon, a set of official rules imposed prices or 
punishments for breakdowns in financial and familial relationships. The ruler 
Hammurabi, presumably reflecting some cultural consensus, must have viewed these 
penalties as appropriate responses. The Code of Hammurabi’s nearly 300 provisions 
included penalties designed to compensate the wrongfully injured for others’ selfish 
or lazy behavior.2 Other penalties more than compensated the injured by imposing a 
heavy burden on the transgressor to deter others from behaving the same way in the 
future. And some penalties denounced and punished bad people’s evil, selfish choices, 
deliberately inflicting pain and suffering upon them, separate from compensation or 
deterrence. These penalties clearly counted as punishments, not options. No rational 
person would choose them, and little good would come from them—except justice.
 The Code, our first still extant formal code of rules, included purely priced 
options: “If any one hand over his garden to a gardener to work, the gardener shall 
pay to its owner two-thirds of the produce of the garden . . . and the other third shall 
he keep.”3 This split between owner and cultivator acted as a simple price without 
penalty. But suppose “the gardener do no work in the garden and the product fall 
off ”? In that case, “the gardener shall pay in proportion to other neighboring 
gardens.”4 This penalty—the difference between the neighbors’ average and the 
gardener’s poor yield—would act as a penalty designed purely to compensate the 
owner disadvantaged by the gardener’s inefficiency. Suppose the person who “take[s] 
over a field to till it, and obtain[s] no harvest. It must be proved that he did no work 
on the field.”5 What should we do to this ultra-lazy, negligent tenant-farmer? “If he 
do not till the field, but let it lie fallow, he shall give grain like his neighbor’s to the 
owner, and the field which he let lie fallow he must plow and sow and return.”6 Here, 
2. For a list of all 282 edicts, see The Code of Hammurabi, Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
ancient/hamframe.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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the penalty more than compensates the owner; it also acts as a deterrent to other lazy 
tenant-farmers, and operates in that sense as a punishment. In contemporary tort 
terms, the extra labor plus the grain acts as punitive damages.
 Hammurabi applied penalties to the familial as well as the commercial. Suppose a 
husband has grown tired of his sickly wife and wants another. He may remarry, but 
“[i]f a man’s wife be seized by disease, if he then desires to take a second wife he shall 
not put away his wife, who has been attacked by disease, but he shall keep her in the 
house which he has built and support her so long as she lives.”7 Here, the obligation to 
support a sick wife for life becomes part of the cost of exercising the option to take a 
second wife. It also gives the sickly, rejected wife an option of her own: “If this woman 
does not wish to remain in her husband’s house, then he shall compensate her for the 
dowry that she brought with her from her father’s house and she may go.”8 So the 
price he pays for taking a second wife is the option his sickly wife exercises: lifetime 
support in the marital home or liberation and return of the dowry.
 Long before 1750 B.C., wives, too, sometimes grew discontent and might want 
to separate from their husbands. Whose foul? It depends: “If a man’s wife who wishes 
to leave his house, plunges into debt, tries to ruin her house and neglects her 
husband,” then he has the option to “offer her release, she may go on her way and he 
gives her nothing as a gift of release.”9 He keeps her dowry as a compensatory penalty 
for her household mismanagement. Or “[i]f her husband does not wish to release her, 
and if he take another wife, she shall remain as servant in her husband’s house.”10 
This option, converting the neglectful wife into the lower status of lifelong household 
servant, clearly denounces her neglectful behavior, and should deter others. Perhaps, 
too, it serves retributive purposes by imposing pain and suffering. But suppose she 
doesn’t ruin the house, and instead “quarrel[s] with her husband, and say[s]: ‘You are 
not congenial to me.’”11 She wants out. Then “her reasons must be presented.” If 
there is no fault on her part, but he neglects her, “she shall take her dowry and go 
back to her father’s house.”12 Pure compensation and freedom for the neglected wife. 
But what if after inquiry, she’s found at fault? “If she is not innocent but leaves her 
husband, and ruins her house, neglecting her husband, this woman shall be cast into 
the water”—that is, killed by drowning.13
 From this grotesque, asymmetric sexism that barely penalizes a neglectful 
husband yet kills a neglectful wife, here we see penalties acting as compensation or 
denunciation, deterrence and arguably retribution—depending upon the culpable 
mental states of the actors.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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 At the end of his Code, Hammurabi issued a stern warning to his successors who 
would in the future administer it: Apply the rule book accurately, avoid gamesmanship 
by bending or stretching the rules—or as Hammurabi phrased it, avoid “corrupting 
my words.”14
III. ANCIENT GREECE
 A thousand years after Hammurabi, the Ancient Greeks imposed penalties for 
cheating in competitive sport. The rules of pankration, a very popular mixed martial 
arts Olympic sport combining wrestling and boxing, prohibited eye-gouging and 
testicle-grabbing.15 Referees stood over combatants and penalized infractions by 
whipping or beating the offender with a stick as he fought.16 The Ancient Greeks 
never inflicted corporal punishment on free men, except for violating sport rules.17 
This penalty then acted as more than simple compensation for the victim: The 
whipping denounced and humiliated the transgressor, and as applied, became painful 
and degrading—clearly retributive.
 Penalties not only respond to violations, but also supply a motive to comply with 
the rules. And yet, the Ancient Greeks recognized that penalty avoidance could not 
be the sole motive for compliance: We keep to the law because it commands our deep 
respect, Pericles famously declared in his funeral oration of Athens.18 Democritus 
praised the ancient virtue of aidos—an inner feeling of respect for what deserves 
respect and revulsion from wrongdoing per se, not from a fear of punishment:
Self-respect and shame before one’s own conscience should keep one from 
doing a wrong even if no other man will know of it. . . . [H]e who is kept 
from wrong by law is likely to sin in secret, but he who is brought to duty by 
conviction is unlikely to err either in secret or openly.19
A century later, Aristotle refined this view by distinguishing two types of violations 
or transgressions: Some were prohibited and penalized for being wrong in 
themselves—malum in se—while other transgressions were not prohibited and 
penalized because they were wrong, but were wrong only because they were 
penalized—malum prohibitum.20 In sum, for at least 2,500 years, leaders have 
recognized that a well-functioning state or well-played sporting contest requires 
14. Id.
15. Pankration, Ancient Olympics, http://ancientolympics.arts.kuleuven.be/eng/TC007cEN.html (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2018).
16. Jakob Renner, Pankration (Greek Martial Arts), Classical Wisdom Weekly (Oct. 1, 2013), https://
classicalwisdom.com/culture/sport/pankration-greek-martial-arts.
17. Rules and Corporal Punishments, Ancient Olympics, http://ancientolympics.arts.kuleuven.be/eng/
TB015EN.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
18. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 145 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972). 
19. 2 William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy: The Pre-Socratic 
Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus 494, 496 (1965).
20. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk V (W.D. Ross trans., Batoche Books 1999) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
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most participants to abide by the rules, not merely to avoid penalties but also from an 
allegiance to the activities the rules constitute.21
 Set against this point of view, a more pragmatic perspective toward penalties also 
suffused Ancient Greece. Aristotle’s distinction between behavior bad in itself and 
transgressions bad only because they were prohibited made little sense to the sophists, 
those ancient Western pragmatists who denied rules’ objective moral content. Nothing 
was true or false, good or bad in itself; everything was only true or false, good or bad 
relative to some conventional system. “A man can best manipulate justice . . . when in 
the company of witnesses he upholds the laws,” declared Antiphon, representing his 
fellow sophists who insisted there was no truth but merely appearances and the art of 
persuasion. “So if the man who transgresses the legal code evades those who have 
agreed to these edicts he avoids both disgrace and penalty.”22
 Today, the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down penalties when they are found 
“grossly disproportionate” to the crime and therefore violative of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.23 Mostly, however, 
it defers to the legislature to define crimes and deserved punishments which are 
proportional because and only because the legislature, the people’s representatives, 
say they are.24 Sport today ref lects this same split: Some fouls seem serious in 
themselves, essential transgressions objectively calling for serious penalties, while the 
vast majority of transgressions can only be understood in relation to the rules that 
establish them.
IV. THE MODERNS: KANT VS. HOLMES
 Modern giants continued the conflict between obedience from respect for the 
rules or from fear of the consequences. We obey the rules, explained Kant, sounding 
much like Pericles, “act[ing] out of reverence for the law . . . [as] something which 
does not serve my inclination but outweighs it.”25 No fear of penalties motivates a 
person who reveres the rules. Instead, Kant insisted, a feeling self-imposed and 
distinct from inclination or fear restrains the citizen.26
 The sophists, too, had their modern successors, prominent among them, U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who saw law as simply the 
21. Plato’s Socrates submitted to his own punishment of death when he could have escaped. See Plato, 
Crito 5–12 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Wildside Press 2018) (c. 360 B.C.E.). Proclaiming his respect for 
the institution of law and its process of adjudication, he felt duty-bound to submit and not evade the 
punishment, however unjust the jury’s verdict may have been in his case. Id.
22. Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers 147 (1983).
23. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see 
also U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
24. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (“[P]rominence is given to the power of the legislature to define crimes and 
their punishment. We concede the power in most of its exercises.”).
25. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals in Focus 31 (Lawrence Pasterneck 
ed., Routledge 2002) (1785).
26. See id. at 32.
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prediction of public force27—the discounted value of penalties attaching to rule 
violation. Morality? Irrelevant. Holmes famously defined a legal duty as “nothing 
but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer 
in this or that way”28 by the judges. Thus Holmes conceived of the law as simply “the 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious.”29 
Penalties were simply the price paid more or less certainly for actual or claimed rule 
violation. “From [a bad person’s] point of view,” Holmes famously challenged us, 
“what is the difference between being fined and taxed a certain sum for doing a 
certain thing?”30
 A pragmatist sees no difference between a price and a punishment. Duty merges 
into fear, and dutiful obedience which purports to exist separate from the prospect of 
penalty “grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid.”31
V. THE PENALTY KICK: PRAGMATISM TRIUMPHS ON THE FOOTBALL PITCH
 With Holmes, the dominant mood in philosophy and practice of law turned 
pragmatic. Just as the Roman emperors professionalized Olympic athletics, played 
now more for the audience than the athletes, so, too, around the turn of the twentieth 
century, a great transformation took place within the world’s most popular sport—
football, or “soccer” in the United States—long the province of amateurs and 
gentlemen. In the 1880s, crowds grew, “and horror of horrors, players were beginning 
to be paid.”32 Fouls were few, play could be rough, even turn deadly, but no matter 
how serious the violation, the offended player could not score a goal directly from a 
free kick. The transgression of batting away a sure goal with hands carried a price 
well worth paying—an indirect free kick, which rarely scored.33
 Victorian sensibility held that no gentleman would ever intentionally do such a 
thing. Thus no penalty need be authorized. An intentional foul would never occur 
and an accidental foul had no moral significance. In the early 1880s, however, the 
football association introduced a “law” which gave referees “the discretion to award a 
goal” when a player other than the goalkeeper handled the ball and thereby “prevented 
a goal being scored.”34 But referees, largely seen as unnecessary, could only award a 
goal as a penalty if the players appealed to them. As football itself became 
27. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897) (“The object of our study, 
then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the 
courts.”).
28. Id. at 458.
29. Id. at 461.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 462.
32. Clark Miller, He Always Puts It to the Right: A History of the Penalty Kick 5 (1998).
33. Id. at 6–7. While a direct kick is shot on goal, an indirect kick requires the ball to first touch another 
player before going in.
34. Id. at 8.
258
PENALTIES: PUNISHMENTS, PRICES, OR REWARDS?
professionalized, and the monetary incentives grew, athletes discovered and employed 
“professional fouls.”35 Early in 1891, in a quarterfinal championship match, “winning 
1-0, [a defender] fisted the ball clear with his goalkeeper . . . well beaten and the ball 
clearly destined for the goal.”36 The opposing team, awarded a free kick, could not 
under the rules score directly. The goalkeeper and defenders blocked the shot and 
the offending team won.37
 Everybody knew the “penalty” grossly failed to compensate or deter. And so, a 
few months later, the authorities felt forced to concede that the professional foul—a 
result of a “win at all costs” attitude—required a professional penalty. Originally 
proposed one year earlier by William McCrum, an Irish goalkeeper proud of his 
reputation for sportsmanship, the penalty kick would punish not just an individual 
offender but the whole team.38
 In June of 1891, a year after soundly rejecting McCrum’s penalty kick as a “slur 
on the integrity of football players everywhere” for suggesting that players would 
intentionally resort to unsportsmanlike methods, the football association adopted 
the penalty as a pragmatic response to the human impulse to profitably and 
intentionally cheat:
If any player shall intentionally trip or hold an opposing player, or deliberately 
handle the ball within 12 yards from his own goal-line, the referee shall, on 
appeal, award the opposing side a penalty kick. . . . All players, with the 
exception of the player taking the penalty kick and the goalkeeper, shall stand 
behind the ball. . . . A goal may be scored from a penalty kick.39
 For years, the best amateur team of England, the Corinthians, simply refused to 
recognize the new law—criminals may intentionally commit crimes, but gentlemen 
never committed intentional fouls.40 The Corinthians refused to attempt to score 
from a penalty kick and their goalkeeper refused to attempt to save a goal from a 
penalty kick, standing aside and allowing the opponent to shoot into an open goal.41 
This civil disobedience stood as a principled rebuke to penalties as punishments. But 
paid professionals soon replaced these champion amateurs and “robbed the penalty 
kick of its sting.”42 The new professional pragmatic ethos fit neatly with American 
35. See id. at 10.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10–11. There was apparently no extended discussion then of the ethics of collective punishment, a 
problem that will have a contentious history ahead of it, stretching to today’s controversy over banning 
the Russian team at the 2016 Olympics for its state-sponsored doping. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Russia’s 
Track and Field Team Barred from Rio Olympics, N.Y. Times (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/18/sports/olympics/russia-barred-rio-summer-olympics-doping.html. The Ancient 
Greeks never faced this issue, as all their sports were individual.
39. Miller, supra note 32, at 11–12. 
40. Id. at 16–17.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 20.
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pragmatism: While the amateurs saw the penalty kick as a shameful punishment to 
be avoided at all costs, these rising professionals looked upon the penalty kick as a 
price to be risked and paid whenever worth it. And all too often, with goalkeepers 
consistently making saves, the penalty was well worth the foul.
 With the appearance of a penalty kick, the gamesman quickly replaced the 
gentleman. A clever player might still calculate the offense of deliberate handball as 
advantageous. Thus in 1903, pragmatists added another rule change, this time to 
prevent a penalty from becoming a reward. “Advantage” entered football: “The 
referee may refrain from [calling penalties] where he is satisfied that by enforcing 
them he would be giving an advantage to the offending side.”43 One commentator 
characterized this new law as “a blow at the astute and unprincipled player,”44 a 
phrase well calculated to illustrate the tension between gamesmanship and 
sportsmanship. These pragmatic players, worthy descendants of Antiphon and 
Holmes, had “managed to twist even a law specially imposed to deter [them] from 
unfair play to [their] advantage. For rather than run the risk of losing a goal [they] 
preferred to take the chance of a penalty kick, which experience had shown [them] 
failed in a large percentage of cases.”45
 Today, the vast majority of penalty kicks result in goals, and the refs continue to 
adjust their calls to prevent penalty rules from getting in the way of the game they 
supposedly constitute, often ignoring mild fouls within the penalty area rather than 
producing a game-altering penalty kick.46 Everybody knows it, and nearly everybody 
accepts it.
IV. THE PUSHBACK ON HOLMES: H.L.A. HART
 The evolution of football’s penalty kick seemed a perfect triumph of the sophistic 
Holmesian pragmatic view that conceived law from the “bad person’s” perspective as 
nothing but a prediction of the exercise of official power. Rules, a game theorist 
might claim, simply direct officials to do certain things under certain conditions.47 
Laws, then, are merely the basis for predicting what officials—the courts or refs—
will do. But if players (or citizens) conceive rules as directed not to them but to 
officials, then those commands lose all morally binding force on the players. The 
penalties become nothing more than prices. The referees or police displace the moral 
conscience of players who might otherwise feel restrained by a sense of community 
43. Id. at 38.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Mitchell Berman, “Let ‘em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 Geo. L.J. 1325, 1366–68 
(2011) [hereinafter Berman, “Let ‘em Play”] (suggesting that referees, aware of the high price a penalty 
kick might exact on a traditionally low-scoring game, adjust their penalty-calling accordingly). Berman 
also discusses this phenomenon in his article from this Issue, Why Sport Illuminates Law (and Vice Versa), 
63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 235, 245–47 (2018–2019).
47. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 102 (3d ed. 2012).
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with their opponents.48 By this account, the rules become contingent commands to 
officials and a price list to the players. These prices do not act as internal restraints 
so much as external threats.
 Sooner or later, however, counterparts to Pericles, Socrates, Democritus, and 
Kant who had embraced the essential necessity for voluntary compliance out of 
respect for the system would push back. H.L.A. Hart insisted this Holmesian 
attitude toward foul behavior fails to capture something absolutely vital. We condemn 
cheaters when we catch them not only because they miscalculated the probability of 
detection and penalty, but on a deeper, more constitutive level: Because they 
calculated at all.49 Equating obligation with probability of penalty, Hart insisted, 
“miss[es] out on a whole dimension” of social life.50 For those who feel obliged to 
follow the rules, “the red light is not merely a sign that others will stop: [T]hey look 
upon it as a signal for them to stop, and so a reason for stopping.”51
 Drawing on games to illustrate this profound “internal” dimension, Hart cites 
chess. Sometimes “predictions of what a court will do are like the prediction we 
might make that chess-players will move the bishop diagonally: [T]hey rest ultimately 
on an appreciation of the non-predictive aspect of rules, and of the internal point of 
view of the rules.”52 Even if somehow I could get away with changing my chess 
piece’s position illegally when my opponent takes a bathroom break, few serious 
chess players would dream of it. In short, for the majority of society, “the violation of 
a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a 
reason for hostility.”53
 Can the same be said for elite players and coaches? Will the majority adopt an 
“internal point of view,” forgoing the temptation to violate even when they calculate 
that the benefit of violation outweighs the cost? Do players view penalties as prices 
possibly worth paying, or do they treat penalties as punishments to be avoided at all 
costs?
[T]he life of any society which lives by rules, legal or not, consists in a tension 
between those who, on the one hand, accept and voluntarily cooperate in 
48. Joyce Carole Oates made this point powerfully in her essay On Boxing:
The referee, the third character in the story, usually appears to be a mere observer, even 
an intruder . . . . But so central to the drama of boxing is the referee that the spectacle 
of two men fighting each other unsupervised in an elevated ring would appear hellish, 
obscene—life rather than art. The referee is our intermediary in the fight. He is our 
moral conscience, extracted from us as spectators so that, for the duration of the fight, 
“conscience” is not a factor in our experience; nor is it a factor in the boxers’ behavior.
 Joyce Carol Oates, On Boxing, N.Y. Times (June 16, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/16/
magazine/on-boxing.html; see also Joyce Carol Oates, On Boxing 47 (Harper Perennial 1994).
49. See Hart, supra note 47, at 90.
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 147.
53. Id. at 90.
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maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other persons’ behavior in 
terms of the rules, and those who, on the other hand, reject the rules and 
attend to them only from the external point of view as a sign of possible 
punishment.54
Legal theory must somehow accommodate both points of view, Hart insisted. Sport 
theory too.
 Although we might desire fully to be bound by the rules, language cannot 
precisely describe, nor humans fully anticipate, every set of circumstances that may 
arise. Experience becomes infinitely richer than any set of rules specifically designed 
to govern it. Thus we fail to describe fully every violation and cannot precisely 
delineate all penalties that should follow in every circumstance.55 Judges and referees 
must interpret and apply the rules by resorting to criteria or standards outside the 
rules themselves. Because we cannot always determine in advance with exact 
precision who transgresses or cheats and exactly what penalty they should get, the 
“disappointed absolutist” becomes a “rule sceptic.”56 Embracing the ancient sophistic 
perspective, these skeptics insist that anybody who violates a rule and gets away with 
it cannot cheat and has not cheated.
VII. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SPORT
 Both law and sport long shared common problems: What are the real rules, as 
against the posted rules? Can unwritten rules of law or sport be more binding than 
the written rules? When a participant breaks or violates written rules defining a 
practice, what penalties do and should follow? Should judges or referees apply rules 
literally? Should they adjust enforcement to the situation?
 A. What Are the Real Rules?
 Aristotle taught us that the strictest justice sometimes produces the greatest 
injustice. Thus, we need equity to supplement or sometimes supplant the written 
rules.57 In the New York Penal law, Article 5 declares that the rules shall not be 
strictly construed; rather, they “must be construed according to the fair import of 
their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.”58
 John Locke urged the vital necessity for executive prerogative in an emergency—
the right to go outside the rules for the good of the whole.59 Standard “choice-of-evils” 
54. Id. at 91.
55. “It is impossible to provide by rule for the correction of the breach of every rule,” Hart declared. Id. at 
143; see also J.S. Russell, Remarks on the Progress of a Jurisprudence of Sport, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 175, 
178–80 (2018–2019) [hereinafter Russell, Remarks]; J.S. Russell, Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work 
With? 26 J. Phil. Sport 27, 30–32 (1999) [hereinafter Russell, Rules].
56. See Hart, supra note 47, at 138–39.
57. See Aristotle, supra note 20.
58. N.Y. Penal Law § 5.00 (McKinney 2018).
59. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 84 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690).
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provisions in penal codes today allow a person to violate every single command: Any 
act that would otherwise be criminal becomes justifiable when, according to ordinary 
standards of intelligence and morality, rule violation avoids a much greater harm that 
would occur by following the rules.60 So the rules themselves demand transcendence; 
they declare occasions for dispensing with their own literal application. They call for 
something more. Ronald Dworkin continued this tradition of transcendence by 
emphasizing principles underlying the written rules. Whereas rules introduce a 
dichotomy—obey or violate—principles have weight and incline a decision in one 
direction or another. Principles operate in context rather than isolation.61
 Philosophy of sport quickly embraced these insights from legal jurisprudence. 
John Russell took the lead in developing a jurisprudence of sport, searching for and 
finding a theory of umpire enforcement by drawing on legal jurisprudence. While 
some formalists insisted written rules alone constituted a game or sport,62 classical 
debates in legal jurisprudence and Dworkin’s jurisprudential theory provided Russell 
a “framework for a theory of umpire discretion.”63 Just as judges interpreted statutes 
“by providing the best moral interpretation of previous judicial decisions, in particular 
by showing those earlier decisions in the best light,” so, too, umpires were obliged to 
get it right and “decide controversial cases in a principled way where the rules are 
significantly indeterminate.”64 When it comes to issuing penalties, “umpires 
legitimately use their authority to clarify and resolve ambiguities in rules, to add 
rules, and even at times to overturn or ignore certain rules.”65 Their discretion should 
be “governed by principles underlying the games themselves and by an ideal” of the 
game’s “integrity.”66
 Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York and later Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, had insisted that the “Constitution is what the judges say it is.”67 
Famous umpires have similarly insisted that a pitch becomes a ball or strike only 
because the umpire called it that way.68 Russell pushed back against these modern 
sophists. Authoritative calls by sport and legal judges could be wrong and rightly 
subject to criticism, and sometimes review and reversal. Umpires, Russell insisted, 
are obliged to interpret the rules “to generate a coherent and principled account of 
60. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05(2) (McKinney 2018); see also Robinson et. al., The American Criminal 
Code: General Defenses, 7 J. Legal Analysis 37, 42 (2015). 
61. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 25 (1967).
62. See J.S. Russell, Broad Internalism and Moral Foundations of Sport, in Ethics in Sport 51, 55 (William 
J. Morgan ed., 2d ed. 2007).
63. Russell, Rules, supra note 55, at 34; see also Russell, Remarks, supra note 55, at 178–82.
64. Russell, Rules, supra note 55, at 35.
65. Id. at 28.
66. Id.
67. 1 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 204 (1951).
68. See George Sullivan & Barbara Lagowski, The Sports Curmudgeon 164 (1993); see also Russell, 
Remarks, supra note 55, at 186.
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the point and purposes that underlie the game, attempting to show the game in its 
best light.”69
 B. An Optimal Level of Crime: “Let ‘em Play”
 Leave it to a law professor to coin the phrase “Jurisprudence of Sport.” 70 In 2011, 
Mitch Berman argued for applying some rules with “temporal variance.”71 Drawing 
on the harmless error concept in law, where an appellate court rightly overlooks 
inconsequential errors, Berman made the philosophical case for cutting athletes some 
slack at “crunch time”—the end of close games—by overlooking minor violations that 
embody the essential physical skills the sport was designed to test and display.72
 Abandoning the rules when the penalty seems disproportionately severe has a 
long history in law.73 So, too, in sport, the principle of “no harm no foul” supplements 
or supplants a literal application of the rules. Having drawn the distinction between 
“tort law (largely designed to ensure compensation for injury),” which requires harm, 
and “criminal law (principally designed to deter and to inf lict retribution for 
blameworthy wrongdoing),” which does not,74 Berman didn’t pursue its implications: 
Should there be more or less temporal variance with penalties that act as prices or 
compensation than with those that act as punishments? After all, prices do vary with 
market conditions. Then again, the notion of letting the punishment fit the crime 
has been modified to letting the punishment fit the criminal.
 But calling it accurately sometimes means calling it inappropriately. A penalty 
strictly corresponding to an isolated rule violation might, in operation and effect, 
undermine the very purpose of the sport it’s meant to constitute or govern. At crunch 
time, when the contest is on the line, sometimes the strictest justice in principle 
becomes the greatest injustice in practice. Berman concludes that just as a commitment 
to a rule of law might sometimes require ignoring the rules in favor of standards or 
principles to accomplish justice, so too a commitment to allowing the contest to be 
rightly decided might require not penalizing certain violations at certain moments. 
For Berman, that cry from the stands to “let ‘em play” has not only deep intuitive 
appeal but also great jurisprudential weight. The harmless error doctrine seemingly 
applies this insight.
69. Russell, Rules, supra note 55, at 35.
70. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”, supra note 46, at 1330.
71. Id. at 1327.
72. Id. at 1333–34.
73. For example, when England automatically attached the death penalty for thefts of greater than forty 
shillings, juries, repulsed by the penalty, often falsely found as a matter of fact that the thief stole 
property worth thirty-nine shillings. Punishment Sentences at the Old Bailey, Old Bailey Online, 
https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
74. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”, supra note 46, at 1339.
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 Berman sought an “optimal degree of laxity.”75 For example, the rules of basketball 
essentially prohibit physical contact. Yet basketball has become a great sport largely 
because refs have not strictly enforced those rules. A basketball game without fouls 
would be sterile. In most sports, what appears to be a rule often turns out to be a 
standard or principle, having weight, pointing officials in a direction rather than 
strictly dictating a penalty uniformly applied.
 So, too, it seems to me, the optimal level of crime in a free society cannot be 
zero. Only in tyrannies where the people live in constant fear of government always 
applying the law literally and harshly does the actual crime rate approach zero. For a 
society or a sport to become the best that it can be, we need to determine an optimal 
level of crime or fouling—neither too little nor too much. We need to enforce rules 
not too strictly nor too loosely, and penalize not too heavily nor too lightly. Only 
then can the practice reach its full potential.
 Berman’s jurisprudence of sport mapped essential concepts from law onto sport, 
including the burden of proof. Official National Basketball Association rules do not 
vary the contact required to constitute a foul; in theory they call for the same penalties 
early and at crunch time, during the regular season and during the playoffs.76 They 
do, however, vary the standard of proof, calling for a “higher degree” of certainty “to 
determine a foul [involving] physical contact . . . during impact times when the 
intensity is risen, especially nearing the end of a game.”77 Burdens of persuasion play 
a key role in criminal law. They also play an increasingly significant and controversial 
role in policing sport.78
 “The formal rules that specify what constitutes a foul are context-invariant,” 
Berman explains, “but the standards of proof that determine whether a particular 
action will be adjudged . . . are context-variant.”79 Could sport or law keep foul-
calling invariant while at the same time vary the penalty according to the level of 
certainty? Berman does not entertain this possibility. But through Berman’s seminal 
work, building on the early lead of Russell, the jurisprudence of sport not only found 
its calling; it has moved into its early maturity.
VIII. SEBELIUS: PRICE VS. PENALTY TAKES CENTER STAGE AT THE BIG THEATER
 The year after Berman gave “Jurisprudence of Sport” its name, the difference 
between a price and a punishment filled the marquee under the stage names “tax” 
and “penalty.” In perhaps the most noticed and controversial U.S. Supreme Court 
case during the Obama administration, twenty-six states and certain individuals 
challenged the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as 
75. Id. at 1333. 
76. See id. at 1334–35.
77. Id. 
78. See infra Part XIII.
79. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”, supra note 46, at 1335 (emphasis in original).
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Obamacare.80 The states insisted the federal government couldn’t coerce them into 
expanding Medicaid to include pre-existing conditions.81 Individuals claimed the 
federal government couldn’t mandate health insurance, requiring they buy insurance 
or make “a shared responsibility payment” as a “penalty” to the IRS.82 
 Viewing penalties functionally, the five states’-rights justices in two separate 
opinions struck down the Medicaid expansion.83 In form, the states had an option: 
Expand Medicaid to cover pre-existing conditions or risk losing all federal Medicaid 
funding.84 In theory, a state could choose to decline to expand Medicaid coverage. In 
fact, losing federal funding for Medicaid would throw a state into a financial health 
crisis. A bare majority struck down that part of Obamacare: Congress simply could 
not constitutionally “penalize”—or punish—states that choose not to participate in 
the new program.85 “Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for 
States to act. . . . But when pressure turns into compulsion” it becomes 
unconstitutional.86 By threatening to withhold all Medicaid funding, Congress had 
given the states “no real choice.”87
 Although he rejected the power of the federal government to coerce the states, 
Chief Justice John Roberts found himself on the other side when it came to its power 
to mandate every individual to be insured. Bitterly disappointing opponents of 
Obamacare, Roberts upheld individually mandated insurance with its “shared 
responsibility payment,” a “penalty” for any person who failed to have or purchase 
insurance.88 Accordingly, Congress might call it a “penalty”—an automatic 
punishment for violating the mandate and failing to be insured—but the people 
would not experience it as such.89 The “penalty” really operated as “a reasonable 
financial decision”—a price, sometimes well worth paying—“rather than . . . [a] 
financial punishment.”90 In sum, the penalty was a price, not a punishment, and 
therefore constitutional. “[I]f someone chooses to pay rather than obtain health 
insurance, they have fully complied with the law.”91
 The four conservative, limited-government justices dissented but embraced 
Roberts’s constricted concept of penalties: “The provision challenged under the 
80. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
81. Id. at 579.
82. Id. at 544.
83. Id. at 529, 589.
84. Id. at 585.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 577–78.
87. Id. at 587.
88. Id. at 568–69.
89. Id. at 565–66.
90. Id. at 566.
91. Id. at 568.
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Constitution is either a penalty or else a tax.”92 It could not be both. But these justices 
failed to recognize the deep ambiguity of the term “penalty,” which can range from a 
pure price to a pure punishment. If Roberts had appreciated that a penalty can 
include a price—a tax without a punishment—he could have more directly upheld 
the penalty as a constitutional price rather than an unconstitutional punishment.
 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her three fellow expansive-government justices 
concurred to uphold the individual mandate and shared-responsibility payment by 
viewing the mandate as an option to “either obtain insurance or pay a toll constructed 
as a tax penalty.”93 These four obviously understood a penalty in its expanded sense to 
potentially include a price—a “penalty collectible as a tax” as they called it elsewhere.94
IX. INSIDE THE PRISONS: PUNISHMENT OR PRICE?
 The Chief Justice upheld the penalty for not purchasing health insurance because 
a citizen would experience that “penalty” as a price but not a punishment. Someone 
who chose to self-insure and make the penalty payment to the IRS would have fully 
complied with the law. Does a similar philosophy adhere in sport? Does an athlete 
who intentionally fouls and takes the penalty fully comply with the law? Philosophers 
of sport continue to debate this issue.
 Those who insist that intentional fouls are not legitimately part of the game have 
looked to criminal law for support. Surely, they insist, although the penal codes list 
the punishments for murder and rape, someone committing those heinous crimes 
have not acted within the law.95 But that analogy seems fundamentally f lawed if 
criminals themselves ref lect the stark disconnect between penalties legislatively 
designed as punishments but actually experienced as options or prices.
 During the thousands of hours I spent inside maximum-security prisons over 
three decades, street criminals, mostly murderers, robbers, and drug dealers—
prototypical Holmesian “bad men”—opened up to me.96 They typically expressed 
little remorse but much regret, directed not toward the victims of their foul behavior 
but inward on themselves or their hustling buddies for their bungled transgressions 
92. Id. at 661 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 621 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In December 2018, the U.S. District of Northern Texas struck 
down the Affordable Care Act  as unconstitutional after a 2017 tax overhaul bill reduced the individual 
mandate to zero. See Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 605 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
95. See Kathleen Pearson, Deception, Sportsmanship and Ethics, in Philosophic Inquiry in Sport 183, 184 
(William J. Morgan & Klaus V. Meier eds., 2d ed. 1995). “Someone might argue that the penalties for 
fouling also are contained within the rulebook for a particular game, and therefore, fouls are not outside 
the rules for the game,” observed Pearson, an early philosopher of sport. “The obvious rebuttal to this 
position is that penalties for breaking the law are contained within the law books, but no sensible person 
concludes, therefore, that all acts are within the law.” Id. For more on this debate, see Paul Gaffney, 
Playing with Cheaters, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 197, 203–06 (2018–2019).
96. See Robert Blecker, The Death of Punishment: Searching for Justice Among the Worst of 
the Worst (2013); Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of 
Punishment Justified, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1149 (1990).
267
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 63 | 2018/19
that police, prosecutors, and corrections detected and punished. “I’m paying for my 
crime by being here,” one armed robber explained. “I’m not angry at you for locking 
me up; you shouldn’t be angry at me for doing what I did to get locked up.”
 Common criminals largely see the law as warnings of prices they should discount 
but might have to pay if they violate the rules. “Don’t do the crime if you can’t do the 
time,” goes a common prison aphorism, embodying the Holmesian pragmatic point 
of view, and carrying with it a corollary. Consider the crime if you can handle the 
time, and do it smoothly so it’s worth risking getting caught. Well-heeled street 
criminals see penalties as threatened punishments that are also actual prices: “Every 
serious stickup man knows he’s going to jail sometime. You try to make it so it’s never 
this time. But it’s going to be sometime.”
 Most career criminals, then, operate according to a cost-benefit calculus, fully 
inheriting the sophistic perspective that there is no truth or justice except as labeled 
by those in power. “The only difference in my mind between a criminal and a non-
criminal is that one gets caught and the other gets away,” said one inmate.97 For 
criminals, respect for the law, and often for other people’s rights, merely means 
carefully avoiding paying the price.
 Ironically, corrections officers often aid and abet prisoners’ perception of their 
penalty as a price but not a punishment. “The way I look at it,” a ranking corrections 
officer explained to me prototypically, “I don’t care what they did or why they did it. 
Prison is the price they pay. And I get paid to keep them here safely.” Corrections’ 
professional ethos demands unconcern with the crime which prison supposedly 
punishes. “I don’t care what a man did out there; I only care how he behaves once 
he’s inside.” Professional officers should not know or care about a prisoner’s violation 
or violence on the streets. Officers across the country escape into their common 
mantra of indifference: “We’re not here to punish; their being here is the punishment.” 
 Legislatures routinely separate crimes according to severity, and judges reduce or 
increase prison terms according to the mens rea and harm a criminal causes. But 
prison administrators divide prison life by security level—maximum, medium, and 
minimum—largely on the basis of escape risk and future danger. Whether a prisoner 
serves a year, ten, or life, day-to-day his lifestyle inside has little to do with the crime 
he committed. In fact, the lifers—those who committed the most heinous crimes on 
the outside—often experience the most unrestricted lifestyle inside. By largely 
quantifying time spent in prison as the primary measure of a penalty, rather than 
qualitatively adjusting daily life inside to the seriousness of a crime, punishment 
becomes less distinguishable from price.
97. This particular inmate, Henry Daniel, expanded on this sophistic perspective: 
They have banking laws that they put loopholes in, and tax breaks they give the rich. 
They get away with their criminal activities because they have the money, the lawyers, 
the power, the prestige, and the intellect to use the word game and get what the system 
calls “compensation.” So when you ask me what’s the difference between a criminal and 
a respectable person, or one who respects the law, it’s one who gets caught and the other 
who doesn’t. Those who have not been caught are what you call innocent, law-abiding 
citizens. And those who have go on record as “criminals.”
268
PENALTIES: PUNISHMENTS, PRICES, OR REWARDS?
 Likewise, criminals see the police on the street violating court-imposed 
restrictions on their own behavior as a price they, too, may be willing to risk or pay. 
When the Supreme Court announced the “plain view” doctrine, allowing a search 
without a warrant only for items in plain view,98 police routinely perjured themselves 
and testified that criminals were dropping their contraband in plain view, knowing 
they would not be penalized.99 So how do police view the exclusionary rule for 
violating a defendant’s constitutional rights during a search and seizure? It’s a price 
often worth risking and paying to get credit for an arrest.
 Experience inside prisons with prisoners over decades convinces me that criminals 
are more willing to violate the law when they view its threatened “punishments” as a 
price list—a true embodiment of the “bad person’s” point of view. For criminals, 
“respect” for the law merely consists of carefully avoiding paying the price.
X. PREVENTING THE PENALTY FROM BECOMING A REWARD
 “Prison preserves us,” one lifer explained to me, revealing why he found his 
“punishment” of life in prison quite tolerable. “If I had kept on ripping and running 
in the streets, I’d be long dead.” For some inmates, the punishment of incarceration 
increasingly becomes a reward. There’s something perverse, of course, when down-
and-out homeless street criminals intentionally commit petty crimes in order to be 
caught and given “three hots and a cot” at the state’s expense through the winter, 
only to be released by spring.100 So, too, some who want to break free from their 
downward spiral commit crimes in order to get sanctioned so they can clean up,101 
get an education, or learn a trade to start fresh on the outside.102 For these violators, 
98. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465–66 (1971).
99. See People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (“For several years now, lawyers 
concerned with the administration of criminal justice have been troubled by the problem of ‘dropsy’ 
testimony.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and 
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 248–49 (1998). 
100. See, e.g., Hungry Homeless Man Gets Arrested Intentionally, Associated Press (May 1, 2012), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/hungry-homeless-man-gets-arrested-intentionally; Randeep Ramesh, A Fifth 
of All Homeless People Have Committed a Crime to Get Off the Streets, Guardian (Dec. 22, 2010) https://
www.theguardian.com/society/2010/dec/23/homeless-committing-crimes-for-shelter.
101. See Jenny Wagner, Kelly Kultys & Marion Callahan, For Some Addicts, Jail Has Become De Facto 
Treatment, U.S. News (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/
articles/2018-05-29/for-some-addicts-jail-has-become-de-facto-treatment; see also Mark Abadi, Some 
People Get Arrested on Purpose So They Can Go to Jail—and Their Reasons Range from Sad, to Nefarious, to 
Political, Bus. Insider (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/jail-getting-arrested-
deliberately-2018-3#because-theyre-lonely-8.
102. See Undergraduate Degree Correspondence Programs, Prison Educ., https://prisoneducation.com/
correspondence-programs/undergraduate-degree (last visited Jan. 2, 2019); GED and  High School 
Diploma, Prison Educ., https://prisoneducation.com/correspondence-programs/ged-high-school-
diploma (last visited Jan. 2, 2019); Career and Vocational Courses, Prison Educ., https://prisoneducation.
com/correspondence-programs/career-vocational-courses (last visited Jan. 2, 2019).
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the penalty, no longer punishment, has become more than simply a “price” worth 
paying: Perversely, it has become a reward.103
 In sport, too, a penalty can sometimes operate as a reward. When philosophy of 
sport was in its infancy, my graduating thesis from Harvard Law School, To Root in 
a Flowing Stream: Game and Sport as Prototype for Social Solution, talked of “taking the 
penalty” as a prototype for such perverse situations, using the example of an American 
football team about to attempt a field goal that intentionally delayed the game to be 
“penalized” five yards. Although now further from the uprights, their new spot 
actually decreased the angle for the kicker and made it easier to kick the field goal. 
The penalty for delay of game acted as a reward.
 Life may be full of such anomalies—consider the adage “the squeaky wheel gets 
the grease”—but sport usually seeks to prevent turning a penalty into a reward for the 
transgressor. American football allows the team on offense to continue a play 
notwithstanding a defensive foul, and “[u]nless expressly prohibited, the penalty for 
any foul may be declined by the offended team and play proceeds as though no foul 
had been committed. The yardage distance for any penalty may be declined, although 
the penalty is accepted.”104
 Similarly, the baseball rule book provides that when a fielder interferes with a 
batter or baserunner, the “manager of the offense may advise the plate umpire that he 
elects to decline the interference penalty and accept the play.”105 The corollary directs 
the umpire who has called catcher’s interference “with play in progress” to “allow the 
play to continue because the manager may elect to take the play.”106
 Soccer’s “playing the advantage” most clearly demonstrates a sport’s commitment 
to prevent making a penalty into a reward: The referee allows the play to continue 
when the victimized team might benefit from such an advantage.107 Later the ref 
penalizes the original violation only if the anticipated advantage does not materialize.108
 While not allowing a team to decline a penalty, basketball to a small degree seeks 
to avoid turning a penalty into a reward by allowing a player fouled in the act of 
shooting to continue, and then crediting the basket if made.109 Then again, there’s 
“Hack-a-Shaq”—the practice of fouling the same weak foul-shooter every time his 
103. Sigmund Freud, who wrote next to nothing about crime and punishment, did posit that criminals 
subconsciously commit crimes from a sense of guilt in order to be punished, claiming that for them 
punishment acted as a reward. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents 62 (Dover 
Thrift 2016) (1930).
104. NFL, 2018 Official Playing Rules of the National Football League 56 (2018), https://
operations.nf l.com/media/3277/2018-nfl-rulebook_final-version.pdf.
105. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, Official Baseball Rules 24 (2018), http://mlb.mlb.com/
documents/0/8/0/268272080/2018_Official_Baseball_Rules.pdf.
106. Id. 
107. Int’l Football Assn. Bd., Laws of the Game 2018/19 64 (2018), https://img.fifa.com/image/
upload/khhloe2xoigyna8juxw3.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Rule No. 12: Fouls and Penalties, NBA, https://off icial.nba.com/rule-no-12-fouls-and-penalties/ 
#foultypes (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
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team has the ball, disrupting the flow of the game. Some players and coaches show 
their respect for the game by refusing to employ the tactic, declining to treat a 
threatened penalty as a price well worth paying and instead insisting upon it as an 
absolute prohibition. Why not do it if it works? “It’s just something we don’t do,” said 
Jason Kidd, Hall-of-Fame point guard who, as coach, rejected the strategy.110 Even if 
good gamesmanship, Kidd and many like-minded others, including former coach and 
leading commentator Jeff Van Gundy, see it as disrespecting the sport—undermining 
a genuine athletic test and contest of essential skills the sport was meant to display.111 
Although pure formalists cannot make sense of this, Kidd would not allow the rules 
to undermine or get in the way of the sport they constitute. One could argue that the 
rules themselves are the culprit, greatly underpricing or even rewarding repeated 
fouling, failing to denounce or in any way punish the foul behavior.
 Ordinarily, those who respect sport should be determined to prevent a penalty 
from acting as a reward. But sometimes it just turns out that way. For those of us 
convinced that the National Football League manufactured “Deflategate” and falsely 
“punished” Tom Brady,112 the New England Patriots legendary quarterback, his four-
game suspension at the start of the following season for his alleged “general awareness” 
that team personnel had illegally def lated footballs provides a most satisfying 
example.113 The Patriots won three of those four games during the ageless but aging 
Brady’s forced rest and relaxation.114 In the end, down 28-3 in the beginning of the 
third quarter, Brady had just enough left in the tank to stage that miraculous comeback 
to win the Super Bowl.115
110. Conversation with Jason Kidd, then head coach of the Milwaukee Bucks, in Milwaukee, Wis. (Feb. 23, 
2016). Kidd is the same coach who desperately needed a timeout he didn’t have and ordered his player to 
accidentally bump into him to spill his soda, requiring officials to stop the clock while they cleaned the 
spill and allowing Kidd to diagram a play. Brian Mahoney, Nets’ Kidd Pays $50,000 for Cup of Soda, 
Star (Nov. 28, 2013), https://www.thestar.com/sports/basketball/2013/11/28/nets_kidd_pays_50000_
for_cup_of_soda.html. But stopping the clock for thirty seconds to clean up soda, arguably 
gamesmanship, arguably cheating, still respected the athletic sport of basketball as it could and should 
be played. Hack-a-Shaq does not. See What Can Law Teach Sport and Sport Teach Law(yers)? A Symposium 
on the Jurisprudence of Sport, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119, 135–36 (2018–2019) [hereinafter Symposium].
111. See Sam Amick, Jeff Van Gundy Says Change Hack Rule Now, USA Today (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2016/02/04/jeff-van-gundy-adam-si lver-hack-a-shaq-rule-
change/79855426.
112. See Michael McCann, The Only Outside Opinion on Deflategate That Judges Can Hear, Sports 
Illustrated (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.si.com/nf l/2016/03/31/def lategate-tom-brady-roger-
goodell-robert-blecker-amicus-brief.
113. See Dan Eaton, Deflategate: Tom Brady’s Suspension Will Likely Stick This Time, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/26/def lategate-tom-bradys-suspension-will-likely-stick-this-time-
commentary.html.
114. Tim Layden, Four Weeks Without Brady: How the NFL Spurred the Patriots to the Super Bowl, Sports 
Illustrated (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.si.com/nf l/2017/01/25/patriots-tom-brady-suspension-
roger-goodell-super-bowl-51.
115. Barry Wilner, Super Bowl LI: Patriots Overcome 25-Point Deficit to Claim Fifth Title, Metrowest 
Daily News (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/sports/20170205/super-bowl-li-
patriots-overcome-25-point-deficit-to-claim-fifth-title.
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XI. MENS REA
 Except for the rare and disfavored “strict liability” offenses, legislatures have long 
graded crimes and punishments according to a rule breaker’s culpable mental state. 
The Ancient Hebrews and Ancient Greeks reserved the greatest penalty for 
intentional killings aggravated by premeditation and preplanning, demonstrated by 
lying in wait or poisoning.116 A person who did not plan to kill but acted lethally 
with a heightened recklessness, aggravated by a grave risk and depraved indifference 
to human life, deserved the same or nearly the same penalty as the premeditated 
killer. Lesser culpable mental states such as ordinary recklessness, where the actor 
didn’t intend harm but was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk, 
got serious or lesser penalties. Lowest on the ladder of culpable mental states, 
negligence—defined as a grossly deviant, unjustifiable failure to perceive a substantial 
risk—created controversy over whether it was evil enough to be punished. Last and 
least, a pure accident without any culpable mental state—non-punishable, unless, 
again, the actor were held strictly liable, a real rarity in the criminal law.117
 In sum, for centuries, holding the harm constant, the more culpable a 
transgressor’s mental state, the harsher the penalty and the more clearly that penalty 
was meant to be experienced as a punishment and not a price.
 In this regard, sport has lagged far behind the criminal law.
 Sport has long equated accidental with unintentional. “[C]onsider the case of 
accidental fouls,” declared Kathleen Pearson, during the infancy of philosophy of 
sport.118 “[A]n act must be designed to deliberately interfere with the purpose of the 
activity in order for that act to be labeled unethical. Since the criterion of intentionality 
is missing from the accidental foul, that act has no ethical significance.”119 For Pearson 
and likeminded philosophers of sport, the players’ attitudinal field divide into two: 
intentional and accidental. Anyone even slightly acquainted with centuries of criminal 
jurisprudence would scoff at such simplistic naiveté. Yet, by and large, sport rule 
books fail to ref lect even that, only occasionally distinguishing and penalizing 
intentional fouls more harshly than “unintentional,” ones which they wrongly equate 
with “accidental.” Rarely do rule books or referees single out recklessness and almost 
never negligence as separately punishable mens rea of lesser culpability.
116. See generally Russell E. Gmirkin, Plato and the Creation of the Hebrew Bible (2017) 
(comparing ancient laws and punishments for various crimes). 
117. The Model Penal Code provides a classification of culpable states of mind as follows (in descending 
order of severity): 1) purposely: the agent had a “conscious object” to commit the act; 2) knowingly: the 
agent is “practically certain” that conduct will produce an effect; 3) recklessly: the agent “consciously 
disregard[ed]” knowable and foreseeable risk; 4) negligently: the agent did not know of the risk but 
should have known. Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2017).
118. See Pearson, supra note 95, at 184.
119. Id.
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 The ankle injury to basketball’s superstar Kawhi Leonard during the 2017 NBA 
Playoffs elicited an unusual recognition and discussion of unintentional recklessness.120 
Whether or not Zaza Pachulia intended to injure Leonard by planting his large foot 
on Leonard’s likely landing spot, the big man must have been aware and certainly 
should have been aware that he was subjecting Leonard to a substantial risk of a 
twisted ankle—a series-ending injury upon landing. Coach Gregg Popovich, furious 
at the loss of his superstar and certain loss of the series, emphasized the seriousness 
of common law and common-sense reckless manslaughter, although the coach’s 
better analogy would have been to reckless assault.121
 Some commentators, however, pointed out that refs rarely call a foul on other 
players who plant a foot on a jump shooter’s likely landing spot when the shooter 
lands uninjured. A penalty in such instances seems more compensatory than punitive. 
But that, again, displays basketball’s relative insensitivity to recklessness as a culpable 
mental state that should be punished. Criminal codes generally define and punish 
the crime of reckless endangerment, whether or not injury results. 
 Reckless endangerment in sport should be a foul worthy of punishment.
 Whether or not to punish negligence—an unjustifiable failure to perceive a 
substantial risk—has divided legal philosophers at least since Aristotle, who argued 
that a person could choose to develop an inattentive persona.122 Today, although 
statutes and courts punish criminally negligent homicide as a felony with prison 
time,123 negligent assault generally requires a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon 
in addition to injury, and negligent endangerment generally does not exist.124 With 
negligence: no harm, no crime. But at least criminal law struggles with a hierarchy of 
culpable mental states, and consciously seeks a proportionate response to the reckless 
actor’s dangerous behavior whether or not it resulted in harm. In deciding when the 
appropriate penalty imposed upon the negligent or reckless actor should be 
punishment, clearly beyond compensation that would otherwise arise in tort, criminal 
law has continued to develop and refine its views as science has progressed.
 Sport has a long way to go.
 Rule books sometimes do distinguish intentional from accidental behavior. But 
rarely, if ever, do the rule books of any sport distinguish recklessness and negligence 
120. See Ananth Pandian, Watch the Questionable Foul by Zaza Pachulia That Knocked Kawhi Leonard Out of 
Game 1, Uproxx (May 14, 2017), https://uproxx.com/dimemag/warriors-spurs-playoffs-kawhi-leonard-
injures-ankle-foul-zaza-pachulia/2; see also Symposium, supra note 110, at 160.
121. For the interview with Popovich and commentary, see NBA Stats All Seasons, Inside the NBA: Did 
Zaza Pachulia Intentionally Injured [sic] Kawhi Leonard?, YouTube (May 15, 2017), https://youtu.be/
HotFKUu9Y4Y.
122. See Aristotle, supra note 20.
123. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 125.10 (McKinney 2018) (“A person is guilty of criminally negligent 
homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person. Criminally negligent 
homicide is a class E felony.”).
124. See, e.g., id. § 120.00 (“A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when . . . with criminal negligence, 
he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”).
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as two forms of intermediate and prohibited culpable “non-intentional” behavior still 
worth penalizing.
 In basketball, a player who intentionally acts illicitly or dangerously will not only 
pay a price, but also be punished, whether or not harm occurs.125 A player faces 
automatic ejection for a “thrown elbow toward an opponent above shoulder level,” 
whether or not there’s actual contact.126 “A player or coach must be ejected,” not only 
for “punching” or “fighting” but also for “an attempted punch or swing with no 
contact,” the NBA rule book reads.127 As phrased, the no-fighting rule conclusively 
rebuts the claim that rules always provide options and prices to players because they 
are solely directed to officials, commanding them to impose certain penalties in 
certain circumstances. “There is absolutely no justification for fighting in an NBA 
game. The fact that you may feel provoked by another player is not an acceptable 
excuse.”128 Banishment for “an attempted punch or swing with no contact” clearly 
punishes the intent without harm.129 But the team whose player has been ejected for 
fighting does not lose possession of the ball. The penalty, suspension plus a fine up 
to $50,000, attempts to punish the transgressor personally while eliminating any 
price for the rest of the team.130
 Sometimes intentional violations, while strictly prohibited, still do not bring 
much of a penalty when no harm results. “The free throw shooter shall not purposely 
fake a free throw attempt,” the rule commands.131 It’s a violation, resulting in the loss 
of a shot, while immunizing opponents who react to the fake by jumping into the 
lane too early. Similarly, “during all free throw attempts, no opponent in the game 
shall disconcert the shooter” by “waving his arms or making a sudden movement” 
within “the visual field of the shooter.”132 And no trash “talking to the free throw 
shooter, or talking in a loud disruptive manner.”133 But what’s the penalty for this bad 
sportsmanship, this intentional attempt at illegal distraction? Pure compensation 
without punishment: “No penalty is assessed if the free throw is successful. A 
substitute free throw will be administered [only] if the attempt is unsuccessful.”134 
No harm, no penalty, although foul, Berman would say.135
125. See Rule No. 12: Fouls and Penalties, supra note 109.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Comments on the Rules—Fighting, NBA, https://official.nba.com/comments-on-the-rules/#fighting 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
129. See Rule No. 12: Fouls and Penalties, supra note 109.
130. Id.
131. See Rule No. 9: Free Throws and Penalties, NBA, https://official.nba.com/rule-no-9-free-throws-and-
penalties (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Berman, “Let ‘em Play”, supra note 46, at 1336–42.
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 Fines can be pure retributive punishments, not prices, even though expressed 
entirely in monetary terms. They only become prices if they’re designed or experienced 
as options.136 Basketball strictly prohibits taunting. It’s not an option, but a command. 
The rule book doesn’t say “punished” of course, but it means to prevent and condemn 
the behavior, and if it occurs, to punish it: “A player guilty of taunting must be 
singled out and penalized.”137 Here, the word “penalized” surely means punished. 
Although the penalty is expressed in dollars, the command is serious, its purpose is 
retributive: “must be singled out and penalized.” The fine should bite you. You 
deserve it. Retributivists can advocate and consciously inf lict monetary pain and 
suffering without being attacked as sadistic.
XII. STRICT LIABILITY: WADA’S PENALTIES FOR DOPING
 The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has adopted an anti-doping code 
(WADC, or the “Code”) that seeks to “promote . . . fairness and equality for Athletes 
worldwide;” ensure equal “detection, deterrence, and prevention” internationally; and 
impose “appropriate consequences” on doping athletes.138 This last goal hints at 
retribution. Although the Code calls its own rules “sport-specific” and “distinct in 
nature from criminal and civil proceedings,”139 it clearly aspires to include well-
established essentials of legal and constitutional due process: fair notice, equal 
protection, and “respect” for “the principles of proportionality.”140
 “It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters 
his or her body,” the Code proclaims.141 So far so good. But then the Code abandons 
the well-established essence of personal responsibility—a culpable mental state: “It is 
not necessary that intent, [f]ault, negligence or knowing [u]se on the Athlete’s part 
be demonstrated to establish an anti-doping rule violation.”142 The Code specifically 
calls it “strict liability” but says that the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)—the 
world’s high court of sport tasked with enforcing the Code143—will take “fault” into 
consideration “in determining the consequences,” the penalty for “this anti-doping 
rule violation.”144
136. Think of double-parking the company car and paying the ticket as a cost of doing business. Of course, 
a large enough fine can drive you out of business.
137. See Comments on the Rules—Taunting, NBA, https://official.nba.com/comments-on-the-rules/#taunting 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
138. World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code 11 (2015), https://www.wada-ama.org/
sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-code.pdf.
139. Id. at 17.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id.
143. See generally History of the CAS, Ct. Arb. for Sport, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/
history-of-the-cas.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
144. World Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 138.
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 So we have a strict liability violation, but the penalty, or what the Code calls 
“sanctions,” will largely depend upon the violator’s culpable mental state.145 “If the 
Athlete establishes that he or she bears “No Fault” or “Negligence” for the violation, 
the Athlete’s individual results” in other competitions may be left intact.146 Further, 
the standard four-year suspension may be reduced for an athlete who establishes that 
the anti-doping violation was not intentional.147 “The term ‘intentional[,]’ [which] is 
meant to identify those Athletes who cheat,” the Code defines to include knowingly 
and recklessly—knowing “there was a significant risk that the conduct might 
constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation and manifestly disregard[ing] 
that risk.”148 While intent doesn’t change the crime, its proved absence can decrease 
the punishment or penalty adjusted to the actor’s fault.
 To some degree.
 However unfair and repulsive to us retributivists—committed to keeping the 
punishment proportionate and never grossly greater than the heinousness of the 
crime, measured largely by the actor’s culpable mental state—the Code, consistently 
enforced by the CAS, demands the automatic disqualification of any athlete whose 
body contains any amount of any prohibited substance, whether or not that athlete 
was at fault, and whether or not that substance in any way advantaged the athlete in 
his or her contest! “An anti-doping rule violation in Individual Sports . . . automatically 
leads to Disqualification of the result obtained in that Competition with all resulting 
Consequences, including forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes.”149
 Are they serious? Or was this a threat never to be actually carried out?
 Sixteen-year-old gymnast Andreea Răducan won a gold medal at the 2000 
Olympic Games.150 Before the women’s individual all-around, Răducan’s doctor 
prescribed a standard cold and flu medication that happened to contain tiny amounts 
of a prohibited substance.151 When drug testing after her victory revealed trace 
amounts of pseudoephedrine in her body, Olympic officials disqualified Răducan 
and stripped her of her gold medal.152 The CAS acknowledged that she gained 
absolutely no competitive advantage, but still upheld the penalty for accidentally 
ingesting even a trace amount of the banned substance.153
145. Id. at 63.
146. Id. at 60.
147. Id. at 63.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 59.
150. Richard Sandomir, Sydney 2000: Olympics: Drug Testing; Arbitrators Reject Appeal by Romanian Gymnast, 
N.Y. Times (Sept. 28, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/28/sports/sydney-2000-olympics-
drug-testing-arbitrators-reject-appeal-by-romanian-gymnast.html.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
276
PENALTIES: PUNISHMENTS, PRICES, OR REWARDS?
 Nor is this an isolated instance. In 2008, U.S. swimmer Jessica Hardy, a world 
record-holder in the women’s 100-meter breaststroke, tested positive for clenbuterol.154 
She had done her best to avoid ingesting any banned substance, consulting with the 
team’s nutritionist, researching the supplement which didn’t list the banned substance 
in its ingredients, and even contacting the manufacturer who assured her it was 
pure.155 Despite her best efforts, Hardy tested positive four weeks before the 2008 
Beijing Olympics and was forced to withdraw.156 “Instead of defending her title, . . . 
she found herself defending not only her reputation against allegations of cheating, 
but also her career against a two-year suspension from swimming competitions,” 
handed down by the CAS.157
 These and other examples of gross injustice should trouble us. Apparently they 
even troubled the very authors of the Code which produced them: “[A] strict liability 
test is likely in some sense to be unfair in an individual case, such as . . . where the 
athlete may have taken medication as a result of mislabeling or faulty advice for 
which he or she is not responsible,” the 2003 WADA Code admitted.158 WADA 
removed this concession from the current 2015 Code, while retaining strict liability.159 
The CAS has steadfastly rejected the principle from criminal law, nulla poena sine 
culpa—no punishment without culpability—calling that basic principle “damaging” 
and rendering “the fight against doping . . . practically impossible.”160
 Perhaps. But allowing for innocence and harmlessness as a defense would help 
restore a semblance of justice, even if the burden of persuasion were placed on the 
defendant to prove she was blameless.
XIII. BURDENS OF PERSUASION: COMFORTABLE SATISFACTION
 The criminal law has long focused on and struggled over burdens of persuasion. 
Civil actions in tort, contract, and property law standardly require the plaintiff to 
prove a claim by a mere preponderance of the evidence—as more likely than not.161 
154. Karen Crouse, For Swimmer, Ban Ends, but Burden Could Last, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2010), https://www.
nytimes.com/2010/08/08/sports/08hardy.html. 
155. See Jessica Hardy Suspension Reduced to One Year, Supplement Ruled as Contaminated; USA Swimming 
Releases Statement; USADA Press Release; AdvoCare Disputes Findings, Swimming World (May 4, 
2009), https://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/jessica-hardy-suspension-reduced-to-one-
year-supplement-ruled-as-contaminated-usa-swimming-releases-statement-usada-press-release-
advocare-disputes-findings-updated.
156. Id.
157. Melissa Hewitt, An Unbalanced Act, 22 Ind. J. of Global Leg. Stud. 769, 771 (2015). “Scores of other 
athletes . . . have either been stripped of their medals or suspended for the accidental ingestion of 
banned substances.” Id. at 770.
158. World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code 9 (2003), https://www.wada-ama.org/
sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_code_2003_en.pdf.
159. See World Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 138.
160. Hewitt, supra note 157, at 773.
161. See Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, Justia, https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/
evidentiary-standards-burdens-proof (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
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Since ancient days, however, criminal law has required a higher degree of certainty 
to convict and punish, crystallized in the formula of more than two centuries: proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.162
 Legislatures and courts have established an intermediate level of certainty, often 
called “clear and convincing”—a standard greater than a preponderance and less than 
beyond a reasonable doubt163—for certain serious civil matters, such as removal of 
parental custody, findings of fraud, or mental incompetence, with quasi-criminal 
penalties, including damage to reputation.
 Again, sport has lagged far behind. 
 The WADA Code reverses the presumption of innocence. Any athlete found 
with even a trace amount of a prohibited substance is presumed guilty, and the 
burden is on the accused by “a balance of probability” to mitigate the suspension by 
showing blamelessness.164
 How certain must the fact finder be of an athlete’s guilt? “The standard of proof 
shall be whether WADA has established a violation to the comfortable satisfaction of 
the hearing panel, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation.”165 “Comfortable 
satisfaction” strikes me as roughly equivalent to “clear and convincing.” And the 
Code confirms it: “This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance 
of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”166 A close reading 
suggests “comfortable satisfaction” as a variable standard within a range. How should 
the fact finder “bear in mind the seriousness” of the offense? The more serious the 
offense the greater or lesser level of certainty required? 
 “Clear and convincing” seems an appropriate standard for deciding and penalizing 
a player for cheating. Baseball employs “clear and convincing” as the standard for an 
umpire to change a call on the field after video review.167 The rules go on, however, 
to impose a higher threshold of probability than would naturally attach to that 
standard: “In other words, the original decision of the Umpire shall stand unchanged 
unless the evidence obtained by the Replay Official leads him to definitively conclude 
that the call on the field was incorrect.”168 Can the replay official who believes it 
eighty percent likely the call was wrong definitively conclude error? College football 
imposes an impossible standard that nobody can apply literally, requiring a challenged 
162. See Robert Blecker, Roots, in America’s Experiment with Capital Punishment 183 (James R. 
Acker et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014). 
163. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (defining “clear and convincing” as “highly probable,” 
thus exceeding the “preponderance of the evidence” standard typical of ordinary civil cases).
164. World Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 138, at 25.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. See Major League Baseball Replay Review Regulations, Section III—Standard for Changing a Call, MLB, 
http://m.mlb.com/official_rules/replay_review (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (“To change a reviewable 
call, the Replay Official must determine that there is clear and convincing evidence to change the 
original call that was made on the field of play.”).
168. Id.
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call to stand unless the reviewing official be convinced by “indisputable video 
evidence” that the call on the field was incorrect “beyond all doubt.”169
 Although strict liability seems indefensibly unfair to some defendants, the WADA 
Code rightly requires guilt of cheating be found to the “comfortable satisfaction” of 
the factfinder, a level of certainty roughly equivalent to “clear and convincing.”
 How unfair, then, that according to the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement, 
Commissioner Roger Goodell could find Tom Brady guilty as a cheat and suspend 
him by merely finding it preponderantly probable—more likely than not—that Brady 
was “generally aware” of a scheme to tamper with footballs.170
XIV. CONCLUSIONS
 When it comes to penalties, a jurisprudence of sport can and should draw heavily 
upon long established legal jurisprudence. Law has always embraced the goal of 
justice and ordered liberty, effected largely by rules publicly posted and equally 
applied by officials. Sport seeks its own justice and truth through the superior 
execution and display of characteristic excellences, primarily physical, but also tactical 
in the choice of moves to be executed, also largely according to rules publicly posted 
and equally applied by officials.
 A. The Continuum of Penalties in Sport
 For thousands of years, at least since the Code of Hammurabi, penalties have 
been meant one way and sometimes taken another. Penalties can be designed to 
operate as pure prices to decrease benefits from chosen options, ranging in probability 
from certain to never, and in weight from heavy to nominal. At the other extreme, 
penalties can be designed as pure punishment—retribution to inf lict serious pain 
upon those who deserve to be denounced and made to suffer for their absolutely 
forbidden behavior. Penalties need not be experienced as they were designed to 
operate. In sport and in life, players and citizens may experience intended punishments 
as prices or sometimes experience intended prices as punishments. 
 Theoretically, punishment follows and fits the crime as an appropriate 
consequence. Actually, the punishment makes the crime. In sport, the penalty 
determines the foul—in form and as experienced. The actual experience of a 
penalty—as price or punishment, as pressure or pain, as option or prohibition, as 
deterrence, denunciation, or retribution—determines the nature of the violation. We 
all know playoff basketball, where the refs “let ‘em play” and don’t call penalties they 
would otherwise call during the regular season. It may be that players will play more 
physically during the playoffs in any case, which forces the refs to adjust their calling. 
But it also seems at least as true that the penalties, loosely or tightly called, determine 
the quality of the play and course of the contest.
 Somebody once defined a chicken as “an egg’s way of making another egg.”
169. NCAA, 2018 NCAA Football Rules and Interpretations FR-107 (2018).
170. See Eaton, supra note 113. 
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 Human nature features a governing selfishness, as the ancient sophists originally 
proclaimed and some still praise to this day. Modern utilitarians also see people as 
rational, calculating pleasure-seekers who balance the benefits from rule violations 
against the pains from threatened penalties. Holmes pragmatically called us “bad”—
and found the reality of law chiefly in how we approach penalties. Law for the bad 
person really only consists in a prediction of penalties—discounted pressure from 
burdens officially imposed or threatened by those in power on those otherwise 
inclined to break the rules.
 For those effectively deterred, the threatened penalty acts as a price not worth 
paying. For undeterred violators on whom officials actually inflict them, penalties 
should teach the penalized that the price of rule violation was not worth paying or 
risking. At the same time, the rule maker hopes the penalty as witnessed or imagined 
will pressure other would-be violators to follow the rules. While legislators 
traditionally embrace deterrence as their primary goal of punishment, its utilitarian 
nature, designed to operate best with rational, calculating pleasure-seekers engaging 
in cost-benefit calculations, suggests a pricing attitude.
 Standard theory gets more subtle. Penalties can disincline players to violate while 
not entirely deterring them, acting as a price ordinarily not worth paying. Some 
penalties should be high prices, greatly to discourage but not absolutely prohibit rule 
violation. With other behavior, rightly called violations—double-dribbling, traveling, 
lost possession of the ball—only slight, if any, moral opprobrium attaches, in the 
sense that somebody performed some act badly or sloppily.
 Penalties as deterrence, then, can represent the fusion of punishment and price. 
The rule maker and rule enforcer may have designed the penalty to deter, but the 
individual penalized or other would-be violators may consider it a price worth paying 
or risking. The violator’s experience of a penalty counts in determining whether the 
penalty has served or failed its purpose.
 The standard “bad man” concerned only with ‘what will happen to me’ approaches 
all penalties as prices—contingent negative consequences following from optional 
rule violations. In order to achieve their goals, both law and sport must impose 
penalties on those who cheat—those who selfishly attempt to gain unfair advantages 
by deceptively violating rules in order to unjustly or falsely earn rewards that go to 
winners. We need penalties threatened and imposed to incentivize selfish players to 
follow the rules. In order to be just and efficacious, these penalties should be 
proportionate to the harm caused by rule violation, at least to compensate the injured 
who played by the rules. The penalties should also prevent unjust rewards from 
flowing to the cheat.
 “In order to work, doesn’t society have to be based on respect for property at 
some level?” I asked a professional thief, probing for any respect he might have for 
the rules and institution of property. “It’s purely percentages,” he replied. “A certain 
percentage has to think that way for society to work.” He’s correct: For any system of 
rule-regulated behavior to succeed and reach its full potential—whether law or 
sport—key officials, citizens, or players must operate not only as cost-benefit “bad 
men,” but also from a richer reality with a more complex set of restraints, whether it’s 
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called “the common good” or “respect for the game.”171 “When a person’s not stealing 
because he doesn’t want to lose his hands, there’s something wrong with the system. 
Same thing with the death penalty. People got to not kill because they care about 
people.”
 Rule formalism only partly explains game reality. Principles, standards, and the 
ethos transcend written rules and operate as a richer realm, just as the real numbers 
are to the rationals. In order to work well and reach its fuller potential, in practice, a 
constitutional plan or sport requires a form of love. Call it patriotism, allegiance, 
loyalty, or duty, loving attachments produce behavior that cannot be fully explained 
or experienced as a price. Listen to criminals describe what they do and what restrains 
them. A richer ethos governs them: Among the old-timers at least, street code strictly 
prohibits and will punish snitching, although official rules encourage it and 
authorities reward it.
 Athletes, too, feel governed to a great degree by their unwritten codes. But while 
discounted threats from written rules surely do not exhaust the ties that bind us, it 
becomes next to impossible to separate the bad men governed solely by selfish appetite 
and fear from those who act from love or respect, patriotism, or duty, truly embracing 
an internal point of view. Probe the Holmesian “bad men” in prison and those who 
confine them, as I have done for decades inside maximum-security prisons. You, too, 
will discover how difficult it can be to disentangle their intrinsic from their 
instrumental morality. How difficult it becomes to separate punishment from price, 
internal from external points of view, illegal but acceptable from unacceptable.
 B. Athletes’ Mens Rea
 Law has a long-established hierarchy from most to least culpable mens rea and 
has punished accordingly. All other things equal, intent is worse than recklessness, 
recklessness is worse than negligence, and accidents which can harm innocents but 
involve no culpable mental state on the part of the harming agent are least culpable. 
Within these broad categories, law has, for centuries, recognized more or less serious 
forms of intent and recklessness. Here, sport lags far behind. Rule books occasionally 
distinguish intentional from unintentional fouls but very rarely acknowledge 
recklessness and almost never separate it from negligence.
 If sports’ written rules did increasingly base penalties upon transgressors’ 
recklessness and negligence along with intent, could referees ever assess athletes’ 
culpable mental states in real time? Law, after all, has the benefit of drawn-out 
investigations and trials after sustained review of the evidence by prosecution and 
defense. In law, as in life, culpable mental states almost always must be inferred from 
the circumstances. We don’t know that the texting driver or other dangerous actor 
consciously ignored a risk, but we infer it beyond a reasonable doubt and punish it.
 Basketball makes it a foul to set a screen within a normal step from an opponent 
“if that opponent is stationary and unaware of the screener’s position.”172 A free throw 
171. Cf. Robert Butcher & Angela Schneider, Fair Play as Respect for the Game, 25 J. Phil. Sport 1 (1998).
172. See Rule No. 12: Fouls and Penalties, supra note 109 (emphasis added).
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shooter “shall not purposely fake a free throw attempt.”173 “Kicking the ball or striking 
it with any part of the leg is a violation when it is an intentional act. The ball 
accidentally striking the foot, the leg or fist is not a violation.”174 Rule 13 allows for an 
instant replay where one player “commits a hostile act against another player” that 
results in the offending player being ejected from the game—for example, “when a 
player intentionally or recklessly harms or attempts to harm another player with a 
punch, elbow, kick or blow to the head.”175 Unawareness, hostility, purposely, 
intentionally, recklessly, and accidentally are all mental states the written rules 
declare a ref should and can infer.
 And yet, the basketball rule book defines its most serious fouls—“flagrant fouls,” 
so called—as “unnecessary contact” (“Flagrant 1”) or “unnecessary and excessive 
contact” (“Flagrant 2”) which results in foul shots for the fouled player and possession 
of the ball, plus automatic ejection and later League review with probable 
suspension.176 But notice that as misnamed and defined, “f lagrant fouls” completely 
ignore the offending player’s culpable mental state. The worst fouls should be 
renamed and reconceived as “dangerous foul” when a player intentionally or recklessly 
unnecessarily exposes another to a substantial risk of physical injury, and worst of all 
a “vicious foul,” where the transgressor intentionally or recklessly with a depraved 
indifference exposes the fouled player to a grave risk of serious physical injury. A 
vicious foul should automatically, upon review, expose the transgressor to suspension 
for at least a season, and perhaps permanently.
 The point is, as criminal law has long known, the violator’s attitude counts in 
determining the appropriate penalty. Beyond determining proportionality, the 
correct label can encourage another fairly long-standing justification for penalties in 
the criminal law: denunciation. Calling it a “dangerous” or “vicious” or “dirty” foul 
denounces it and might more effectively deter it. Denunciation can act as an effective 
deterrent for those who care about their reputation among peers or the general public. 
If teammates as well as opponents denounced dirty play, it would likely reduce such 
behavior, and were elite athletes to ostracize dirty players, it would likely deter others 
from following their example, justifiably hurting the dirty player who deserves it.
 Law and sport have grossly underutilized denunciation. Denunciation generally 
has next to no effect on street criminals caught and punished for robbery or murder. 
The super-wealthy white-collar cheats—or “red collar” criminals as I call them—
who dump cancer-causing chemicals into streams, maintain deadly workplace 
conditions, knowingly manufacture and distribute dangerous toys or cigarettes, and 
look upon threatened penalties as a price of doing business, often retain their social 
173. See Rule No. 9: Free Throws and Penalties, supra note 131 (emphasis added).
174. See Rule No. 10: Violations and Penalties, Section IV—Strike the Ball, NBA, https://official.nba.com/rule-
no-10-violations-and-penalties/#striketheball (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (emphasis added).
175. See NBA Referee Instant Replay Trigger Outline, NBA, https://www.nba.com/official/instant-replay-
guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (emphasis added).
176. See NBA’s Misunderstood Rules, NBA, http://www.nba.com/nba101/misunderstood_0708.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2019).
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status as “successful” despite being caught and penalized with heavy fines and even 
prison sentences. Society generally continues to attach status to wealth, whether 
gained legitimately or by cheating.
 Although denunciation among elite athletes for violating the ethos can act as a 
powerful deterrent and retributive source of pain for those who deserve it, 
denunciation in sport for viciousness and cheating thus far has failed to approach its 
full potential. Rugby has it right when it calls the penalty box the “sin bin.”177 But 
generally, sports have failed to separate rule violations from unnecessary violence and 
cheating—prices from punishments. For decades the NFL glorified and advertised 
its games by replaying the most vicious hits of the week. Only gradually has it come 
to see those as dangerous and vicious fouls. Sport has largely stripped the negative 
and denunciatory connotations that long attached to the word “foul” itself.
 If the penalized don’t feel denounced by it, they don’t feel punished by it; it’s 
simply a price they pay. Even where a penalty does act as punishment, if its purpose 
is only to deter—exert pressure by greatly overcompensating for its own discounted 
value—it still assumes a rational, calculating maximizer who discounts the penalty, 
as Jeremy Bentham proclaimed, by its certainty, swiftness, and severity.178
 Only denunciation and retribution truly prohibit behavior and demand Hart’s 
internal point of view. Retributivists punish and denounce self ishness, not 
miscalculation. They punish for pricing other people’s misery, or as Kant classically 
observed, treating people as a means rather than an end in themselves.179 Sport needs 
more denunciation, both in the rules that define fouls and attach penalties, and in 
the ethos that tolerates and even condones unlawful dangerous behavior, especially 
by teammates in pursuit of victory. Of course, here again it can be difficult to 
detangle the player’s internal point of view that intrinsically values their well-earned 
reputation from an external point of view that values financial rewards from 
endorsements and fears their loss from denunciation.
 C. What Law Can Teach Sport
 Hopefully this journey into penalties as punishments or prices will cast light in 
many directions and suggest avenues for a jurisprudence of sport to pursue. So let me 
close with some observations that the forgoing analysis suggests but does not prove.
 Law has much to teach sport, and if authorities learn law’s lessons they will 
change some rules and enforce others differently to allow sports to more fully reach 
their potential. When rule books and referees further refine culpable mental states 
attaching to fouls to isolate, denounce, and sometimes separately penalize by 
punishing dangerous recklessness, and even negligence, they will diminish dangerous 
177. When the Sin Bin Calls, BBC Sport, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/rugby_union/rules_and_
equipment/4204904.stm (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (“[The Sin Bin] is a place you should avoid at all 
costs.”).
178. See generally Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham (J. 
Browning ed., 1843).
179. See Kant, supra note 25, at 87.
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and destructive fouls. Carrying forward this insight into a concrete, effective program 
requires an insight into the intricacies of the best ethos conducive to contesting 
tactical and physical excellences the sport has been designed to display and test. Only 
elite coaches and players with vast experience and love for their respective sports can 
achieve this. But an awareness of possible developments, often drawn from legal 
jurisprudence, coupled with a self-conscious desire to improve the sport must precede 
the attempt.
 People who price when they should be punished will violate until it’s not worth 
it. If we’re sometimes unwilling or unable to do what it takes to deter them, does that 
mean we should reject all punishment? Penalty as punishment requires retribution 
and denunciation in order to achieve anything near its full meaning and effect. 
Professional athletes seem to feel or express too little communal revulsion at 
dangerous play and dirty fouls. Frequently traded from one team to another, these 
athletes experience a diminished sense of loyalty to their team or teammates. Because 
they too often view penalties as prices, dirty fouls continue, “cheap shots” get priced 
cheaply, and athletes unnecessarily suffer career-ending and life-diminishing injury. 
Too many professional football players, for example, see brain damage as a price for 
earning huge salaries, and thus continue to tolerate it. If they saw it as League-
inflicted, undeserved punishment, they would rebel and force rule changes.
 If athletes themselves learn some lessons from well-operating constitutional 
systems with public officials and citizens constrained to act for the common good, 
they, too, will denounce certain behavior—cheating and dangerous dirty fouls, 
whether by teammates or opponents. Owners and League officials will reconsider 
and readjust penalties—how they’re labeled as well as their operation and effect. 
Taking a lead from criminal law, “violations” should be reserved for relatively trivial 
infractions and bring the lightest penalties, and “fouls” for more serious violations 
that threaten the health of the athletes or attack the integrity of the sport. With 
encouragement and support from the professional leagues, elite athletes will 
increasingly adopt Hart’s internal point of view, rejecting cheating and gratuitously 
dangerous moves, refusing to calculate whether they can get away with it. Instead 
they will ostracize their fellow athletes, isolate and shun them, and tighten the 
community to better police the sports they love and respect.
